THE BILL CREATES TWO DIFFERENT RULES BASED ON AGE

For a child below 13, the proposal is an account ban. Facebook, Instagram, X, TikTok, YouTube, and other platforms identified by the DICT would have to prevent account creation, continuously verify age, disable an underage account when it is discovered, and stop the child from simply creating another one.

For users who are at least 13 but below 18, the rule changes. They could have an account only with verifiable parental or guardian consent and active, continuous supervision. Platforms would have to check age and consent again periodically. If consent is withdrawn or absent, access would have to be restricted or suspended automatically.

This would change an ordinary family's relationship with social media. A parent could no longer settle the question by verbally allowing a teenager to open an account. The platform would need a way to prove that the permission came from a parent or legal guardian and remained in force.

The filed text contains an inconsistency that should be corrected. Its main access provision covers children who are "at least" 13, while its definition of parental consent refers to a child who is "above" 13. The operative provision appears to include a 13-year-old, but the two phrases should match so that families and platforms are not left arguing over one birthday.

PROVING A USER'S AGE COULD REQUIRE MORE PERSONAL INFORMATION

The bill defines age verification broadly. A platform could use a technology that verifies age, a system that estimates age, or another comparable method. Whatever method is chosen would have to be reliable and privacy-preserving while collecting as little personal data as possible.

That balance is difficult. Asking only for a birthday is easy to defeat. A stronger check can involve an official identification card, a record from another trusted source, an estimate based on a face, or patterns in a person's behavior. Those methods may be more accurate, but they can require the collection or analysis of information that a family would not otherwise give to a social media company.

The bill tries to limit the danger. Data collected for age checks must be strictly necessary, securely processed and stored, used only for the law's purposes, and handled under the Data Privacy Act. It also says a platform must not collect or use children's biometric or sensitive data for purposes unrelated to safety, security, or another lawful use.

The National Privacy Commission already requires organizations that process children's personal data to conduct a child-focused privacy assessment and explain data use in a way children can understand. Its guidance does not prescribe one age-assurance tool. It says self-declaration alone may be inadequate when the processing is high-risk.

The proposal goes further by requiring platforms to detect or reduce the use of VPNs and proxy services intended to bypass age checks. A flagged user could be required to verify age again. For a legitimate adult using a VPN for work, security, or privacy, that could mean an extra identity check even when the person has done nothing wrong.

PARENTS WOULD RECEIVE CONTROLS THAT PLATFORMS MUST KEEP AVAILABLE

For users aged 13 to 17, platforms would have to give parents or guardians tools to supervise the account and reach its privacy settings. They could monitor activity, control interactions, set daily time limits and breaks, and withdraw consent for the account.

Child accounts would start with the highest available privacy and safety settings. Platforms would also have to restrict the sharing of the child's location, limit purchases and financial transactions, prevent automatic redirection to outside sites that may cause harm, and place limits on interactions involving the account.

This could give a parent one place to do tasks that now vary across applications. A parent worried about late-night use could set a daily limit. A parent who discovers unsafe contact could restrict the account or withdraw permission. A family would no longer have to depend entirely on whether a company voluntarily offers the same controls in the Philippines.

Continuous supervision can also create conflict inside a family. A 17-year-old may use a private account to seek health information, talk with trusted friends, or ask for help. The bill says children's rights to information, privacy, and expression must still be protected, but it does not explain how those rights will be balanced against a parent's continuous ability to monitor and control the account.

UNICEF's guidance recommends involving teenagers in decisions about privacy and giving them more age-appropriate responsibility as they grow. The final rules will need to distinguish protection from unlimited surveillance, especially for older adolescents.

THE BILL TARGETS WHAT PLATFORMS CHOOSE TO RECOMMEND

The proposal does more than control who can open an account. It regulates the systems that select, rank, recommend, or display content to children.

Platforms would have to keep their algorithms from promoting prohibited content, avoid designs that mislead children or harm their development, and take reasonable steps to detect and limit exposure to harmful material. The bill defines prohibited content as material posing a significant risk to a child's physical or emotional well-being, including violence, sexual exploitation, self-harm, and harmful or misleading information.

Platforms would also have to remove artificially generated or altered content that falsely depicts a person or child or is reasonably likely to mislead users. They would have to explain in understandable terms how recommendations are selected, disclose the use of algorithms, place important decisions under meaningful human oversight, and send periodic transparency reports to the DICT.

For a child scrolling through a feed, the practical change could be in what appears next. A platform could be required to stop repeatedly recommending self-harm material after one search, prevent an altered video from being presented as real, or change features designed to keep a young user scrolling for hours.

The wording also needs precision. "Harmful or misleading information" can cover clear dangers, but it can also reach disputed claims, satire, health discussions, or political speech if the standard is applied too broadly. To avoid large fines, platforms may remove uncertain content quickly. Clear definitions, a complaint process, and an appeal mechanism are needed to reduce wrongful removal.

ENFORCEMENT COULD REACH FINES, ACCOUNT BLOCKS, AND AN ENTIRE PLATFORM

The DICT would monitor compliance, receive complaints, notify platforms of violations, require transparency reports, issue cease-and-desist orders, and coordinate with the National Telecommunications Commission and National Privacy Commission.

After receiving a DICT notice, a platform could be given as long as 90 days to act, subject to the implementing rules. The affected account holder must be notified and given an opportunity to contest the allegation. If the platform later receives a cease-and-desist order, it would have 48 hours to comply.

Failure to act on requests involving prohibited child accounts could produce fines of P5 million for a first violation, P7.5 million for a second, and P10 million for a third or later violation. Failure to comply with specified platform and enforcement duties could cost P20 million to P50 million for each violation, depending on its seriousness and effect on children.

The bill also permits stronger action after notice, an opportunity to comply, and due process. Access to a platform could be temporarily restricted until it complies. Repeated and serious violations could result in a prohibition on operating in the Philippines.

Some listed technical measures are wider than disabling one account. They include blocking a domain name, URL, or IP address that provides access to a prohibited page or account. One domain or IP address can serve many lawful accounts and pages. A poorly targeted block could prevent adults and children from reaching unrelated content along with the account being investigated.

The filed copy also jumps from Section 17 to Section 19. There is no Section 18. That appears to be a numbering error and shows why the text still needs careful cleanup before lawmakers vote on it.